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Abstract
The logical correctness of security protocols is important. So are eﬃciency and cost. This paper
shows that meta-heuristic search techniques can be used to synthesise protocols that are both
provably correct and satisfy various non-functional eﬃciency criteria. Our work uses a subset of
the SVO logic, which we view as a speciﬁcation language and proof system and also as a “protocol
programming language”. Our system starts from a set of initial security assumptions, carries out
meta-heuristic search in the design space, and ends with a protocol (described at the logic level)
that satisﬁes desired goals.
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1 Introduction
The correctness of a security protocol is a crucial design goal, but other, non-
functional, criteria (most typically eﬃciency criteria) are also of considerable
importance. The deﬁnition of “eﬃciency” will vary according to circumstance.
Furthermore, designers often wish to ﬁnd an eﬃcient way of implementing a
speciﬁcation and they may also want to explore the consequences of making
diﬀerent initial assumptions. This paper demonstrates a framework for the
automated synthesis of provably secure and eﬃcient security protocols. Our
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framework views design synthesis as a numerical optimisation problem. We
use the established global optimisation technique of simulated annealing [10]
(see subsection 4.1 for a description) to perform the search. The framework
extends previous work of the authors [5,6,7] which addressed only issues of
logical correctness. Our previous work used BAN logic. In this paper, we use
SVO logic [13], a more sophisticated logic than BAN logic, and thus giving
greater conﬁdence in the practical security of discovered protocols.
2 Protocols and Belief Logics
Since the late 1980’s, formal methods have been used in the ﬁeld of security
protocols [4]. Recent approaches to the use of formal methods in the design
of security protocols include ﬁnite-state model checking and belief logics [12].
In this paper, we will concentrate on protocol security belief logics, which
formalise what a principal may infer from messages received.
Belief logics have played a crucial role in the development of protocol
analysis as a research topic. The earliest, and best known, is the logic due
to Burrows, Abadi and Needham [3], generally referred to as BAN logic. In
BAN logic, the assumptions and goals of the protocols are speciﬁed as beliefs
of principals. A message comprises a set of beliefs held by its sender. The
logic provides various inference rules that deﬁne how a recipient’s belief state
may legitimately evolve upon receipt of a message. Informally, a message of
a sender’s beliefs can be received, but it may be encrypted. If a principal has
the key, then the plaintext may be obtained. However, the principal has no
assurance where the plaintext comes from, unless the message is signed. If a
message is signed, then a principal may assume that the signing principal once
said the plaintext. But he does not know when the message was said, unless
it is fresh, in which case, the principal may assume the signer eﬀectively, says
the message at the same time it is received (that is, the message is timely, and
thus not a replay). Still, the message may not come from a principal trusted
to have the authority to make such statements. If it does, then whatever the
message asserts is considered accurate.
BAN logic is simple and elegant and allows for very short abstract proofs.
However, it does not allow analysis at the level of sophistication required by
some analysts. Accordingly, various other, related, logics have been developed
to ﬁll some of the perceived gaps. This has generally been at the expense of
increased complexity (for example, GNY logic [9] has more than 50 infer-
ence rules). Perhaps the most signiﬁcant of subsequent logics has been SVO
which aims to eﬃciently unify previous logics (BAN [3], GNY [9], AT [1] and
VO [14]). SVO does not simply add on new notation and rules to capture
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the additional scope of these logics. Rather, its aim is to produce a model of
computation and a logic that is sound with respect to that model, whilst still
keeping the expressiveness of the various BAN extensions. We shall use a sub-
set of SVO logic as the basis for our protocol synthesis framework. The parts
of SVO we need for the examples in this paper are given in subsection 2.1.
2.1 SVO Notation
The language of SVO logic consists of the following expressions:
• P believes X: P may act as if X is true.
• P has X: X is a message that P can see. This includes messages initially
available to P , received by P , freshly generated by P , and constructible by
P from the above.
• P received X: P has received a message that contains X, and P can retrieve
X from the message; this may require decryption.
• P said X: The principal P at some time sent a message including the
statement X.
• P says X: X is a statement P said very recently. That is, P must have said
X since the beginning of the current epoch.
• P controls X: P has jurisdiction over X. The principal P is an authority
on X and should be trusted on this matter. An example of jurisdiction is
that principals may believe that a key distribution server has jurisdiction
over statements about the quality of keys.
• fresh(X): X has not been sent in a message at any time before the current
run of the protocol. This is usually true for nonces.
• P
k
←→ Q: k will never be discovered by any principal but P , Q, or a
principal which is trusted by P or Q.
• {X}k: This is the notation for encryption of X by key k. It is assumed that
encrypted messages are uniquely readable and veriﬁable by holders of the
right keys. Similarly, encrypted messages can only be created by a principal
with the appropriate keys.
2.2 SVO Axioms
When a principal receives a message, the logic provides twenty two axioms that
indicate what new beliefs this principal may infer from the message contents.
The axioms we we need for the examples in this paper are given below.
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Belief Axiom
1. (P believes ϕ ∧ P believes (ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ P believes ψ.
Source Association Axiom
2. (P
k
←→ Q ∧R received {XQ}k)⇒ (Q said X ∧Q has k).
Keys are used to deduce the identity of the sender of a message. The
superscript Q in the axiom indicates that the message is from Q (rather than
P ). The axiom applies when any principal R receives {XQ}k.
Receiving Axioms
3. P received (X1, . . . , Xn)⇒ P received Xi, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If a principal received a concatenation of messages, then the principal has
received each component.
4. (P received {X}k ∧ P has k)⇒ P received X.
If a principal received an encrypted message and has the key, then the
principal also received the decrypted message.
Possession Axioms
5. P received X ⇒ P has X
A principal possesses anything he received.
6. P has (X1, . . . , Xn)⇒ P has Xi, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If a principal possesses a concatenation of messages, then the principal
possesses each component.
Saying Axioms
7. P said (X1, . . . , Xn)⇒ (P said Xi ∧ P has Xi), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
8. P says (X1, . . . , Xn) ⇒ (P said (X1, . . . , Xn) ∧ P says Xi), for each i ∈
{1, . . . , n}.
Freshness Axiom
9. fresh(Xi)⇒ fresh(X1, . . . , Xn), for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A concatenated message is fresh if one of its components is fresh.
Jurisdiction Axiom
10. (P controls ϕ ∧ P says ϕ)⇒ ϕ.
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Nonce-Veriﬁcation Axiom
11. (fresh(X) ∧ P said X)⇒ P says X.
Freshness promotes a message from having been said (sometime) to having
been said during the current epoch.
Symmetric Goodness Axiom
12. P
k
←→ Q ≡ Q
k
←→ P .
2.3 GNY Recognisability Rule and Message Extension
SVO logic represents a protocol at the abstract level by asserting compre-
hension of received messages and interpretation of comprehended messages.
These premises almost preclude automated reasoning in that a message of
the same format may carry diﬀerent, context dependant, meaning in diﬀerent
protocols. We avoid this limit by using the GNY Recognisability Rule and
Message Extension [9].
2.3.1 GNY Recognisability Rule
A principal P would recognise X if P has certain expectations about the
contents of X before he actually receives X. P may recognise a particular
value (for example, his own identiﬁer or nonce), a particular structure (for
example, the format of a timestamp), or a particular form of redundancy.
The GNY recognisability rule speciﬁes the formulæ that a principal can believe
to be recognisable, when given his beliefs about the recognisability of other
formulæ.
P believes φ(Xi)⇒ P believes φ(X1, . . . , Xn), for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If a principal P believes that a formula X is recognisable, then he is entitled
to believe that the whole message is recognisable. In this paper, we use this
rule as a replacement of the SVO comprehension assertion.
2.3.2 GNY Message Extension
Typical protocol speciﬁcations often include verbal description to the eﬀect
that a principal should proceed only if certain conditions hold or only if he
holds certain beliefs. This can be regarded as a precondition of a message.
The precondition of a formula X, represented by statement C, is described as
X ↪→ (C), where C is called a message extension. When a receiver receives a
message that contains X ↪→ (C), he should interpret it as such. We use the
notion of message extension to replace the SVO interpretation assertion.
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Initial Assumptions
A has (A,B, S,Na, kas) S has (A,B, S, kas, kab)
A believes A
kas←→ S A believes fresh(Na) A believes φ(Na)
S believes A
kas←→ S S believes A
kab←→ B
A believes (S controls A
kab←→ B)
Goals
A has kab A believes A
kab←→ B
A Feasible Protocol
1. A→S : A,B,Na
2. S→A : {Na, kab ↪→ (A
kab←→ B)}kas
Fig. 1. Initial assumptions, goals and a feasible protocol
2.4 Illustrative Example
Figure 1 gives a set of initial assumptions that are held by principal A and a
key distribution server S, and a feasible protocol.
In this example, a principal A obtains a new secure session key kab to
communicate with another principal B from a key distribution server S. We
start from a set of initial assumptions and intend to achieve the above goals.
Firstly, A possesses their identiﬁers (that is, A, B and S). He also possesses a
particular random number Na (also known as a nonce), and a long term key
kas for communicating with S. Secondly, S possesses principals identiﬁers (A,
B and S) and the long term key kas as well as A. As S plays the role of a
key distribution server, he also possesses the new session key kab. Thirdly, A
believes that kas is secure and Na is a well formed nonce which is both fresh
and recognisable. A also trusts S to provide kab, that is to say A believes that
S has jurisdiction over the new session key. And ﬁnally, S believes that kas
is secure for communicating with A and kab is a good key that can be used
between A and B.
The goals of this protocol are for A to obtain and believe kab is secure for
communicating with B, that is, A has kab and A believes A
kab←→ B. So the
protocol is a fragment of some key distribution protocol.
A believes Na is a well formed nonce and may include it in the ﬁrst message
together with identiﬁers A and B. When the server S receives this message,
he can possess the nonce Na later. However, S could not infer anything from
this message since the message is in plaintext. Now, S may reply to A with
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the second message that contains two components: the newly received Na and
kab ↪→ (A
kab←→ B). S encrypts this message using key kas. Once A receives
this message, he may decrypt it to reveal its contents. Then, by the GNY
Recognisability Rule, the whole message is recognisable by A because Na is
recognisable. That is, A believes that he received (Na, kab ↪→ (A
kab←→ B)).
So, A has kab is achieved by applying the SVO possession axioms. Then, by
GNY Message Extension, A believes that he received (Na, A
kab←→ B). Next,
using the Source Association Axiom, A concludes that S said (Na, A
kab←→ B).
This message contains an assertion involving Na, a nonce A believes to be
fresh, so A may conclude the whole message is a fresh one. Then A may
deduce that S says the whole message using the Nonce-Veriﬁcation Axiom.
In detail, A believes S says (Na, A
kab←→ B). Since A believes that S has
jurisdiction over the new session key, A may now believe A
kab←→ B using the
Jurisdiction Axiom. Note that this protocol is at an abstract logic level and
it is secure with respect to SVO logic at that level.
A possible concrete version of this protocol is:
1. A→S : A,B,Na
2. S→A : {Na, B, kab}kas
3 Eﬃciency of Security Protocols
Current research in security protocols has largely focused on the security of
protocols, and there is very little published discussion on the issue of protocol
eﬃciency (notable exceptions are Boyd & Mathuria [2] and Gong [8]). The
treatment of eﬃciency or performance is generally given a low priority and is
often rather ad hoc. One possible reason is that security protocols normally
involve only a few messages, thus optimisation is not seen as a very urgent
requirement. However, as Gong [8] points out, it is natural and beneﬁcial
to investigate whether a protocol that achieves security requirements in a
particular environment is also in some sense minimal or optimal. For example,
reducing one message from a ﬁve-message protocol represents a 20% reduction
in the number of messages and possibly a similar amount of reduction of the
overall running time of the protocol.
Boyd and Mathuria [2] deﬁne two sorts of eﬃciency: computational eﬃ-
ciency and communications eﬃciency. Computational eﬃciency is concerned
with the computations that the principals need to engage in to complete the
protocol. This will largely depend on the algorithms used to provide the cryp-
tographic services. Communications eﬃciency is concerned with the number
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and length of messages that need to be sent and received during the running
of a protocol. In some sense, computational eﬃciency is an issue that can
be discussed at the concrete level whilst communications eﬃciency can be
expressed at the abstract level. In our system, we deﬁne a collection of ﬁt-
ness functions for expressing eﬃciency issues (number of messages, encryption
method, server interaction etc.) and ways of determining how these concerns
have been achieved. Details of the ﬁtness function are given in subsection 4.4.
4 Search Strategy
Given a speciﬁcation (assumptions as precondition, goals as postcondition)
we wish to search the space of protocols for those satisfying that speciﬁcation.
Any series of honest exchanges between two or more principals deﬁnes a fea-
sible (with respect to the logic) protocol. We consider this set of protocols
as the design space. It is clear that this space grows exponentially as the
number of messages or the number of principals rise. The choices of the con-
tent of messages introduces further combinatorial complexity. For a synthesis
technique to be scalable, it cannot be based on simple enumeration. Our pre-
vious work has shown that the protocol synthesis problem can be couched as
a numerical optimisation problem [5,6,7]. This work was concerned only with
the synthesis of logically correct protocols. In this paper we show how the
approach can be extended to encompass non-functional criteria too. In the
experiments reported in this paper we have used the well-established tech-
nique of simulated annealing [10] (although our implementation allows rapid
interchange of optimisation techniques). Below is a brief introduction to the
simulated annealing algorithm.
4.1 Optimisation Technique
In 1983 Kirkpatrick et al. [10] proposed simulated annealing, a search technique
inspired by the cooling processes of molten metals. It merges hill-climbing
with the probabilistic acceptance of non-improving moves to ﬁnd a good state
S ∈ State . The basic algorithm is shown in Figure 2.
The search starts at some initial state S0 ∈ State. There is a control
parameter T ∈ R+ known as the temperature. This starts high at T0 and is
gradually lowered, typically by geometric cooling (that is, by multiplying by
a cooling factor, α ∈ (0, 1) at each iteration).
At each temperature, a number MIL (Moves in Inner Loop) of moves to
new states are attempted. A candidate state Y is randomly selected from
the neighbourhood N(S) of the current state. The new state Y is accepted
if it is better or only slightly worse than S, as measured by a ﬁtness function
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S := S0
T := T0
repeat until stopping criterion is met
repeat MIL times
Pick Y ∈ N(S) with uniform probability
Pick U ∈ (0, 1) with uniform probability
if f(Y ) > f(S) + T lnU then S := Y
T := α× T
Fig. 2. Basic Simulated Annealing for Maximisation Problems
f ∈ State → R. By “slightly worse” is meant “no more than |T lnU | lower”.
Here U ∈ (0, 1) is a random variable, and so T lnU ∈ (−∞, 0); the smaller T
is, the more likely that this term is close to 0 and eventually only improving
moves are accepted (that is, the technique reduces to hill climbing).
The algorithm terminates when some stopping criterion is met. Common
stopping criteria, and the ones used for the work in this paper, are to stop the
search after a ﬁxed number MaxIL of inner loops have been executed, or else
when some maximum number MUL of consecutive unproductive inner loops
have been executed (that is, without a single move having been accepted).
Generally the best state achieved so far is also recorded (since the search
may actually move out of it and subsequently be unable to ﬁnd a state of
similar quality). Another common improvement to eﬃciency is to generate U
only when f(Y ) < f(S).
In the experiments, we used a geometric cooling rate of 0.97; the number
of attempted moves at each temperature was 400, with a maximum of 300
iterations (temperature reductions) and maximum number of 50 consecutive
unproductive iterations (that is, with no move being accepted). Further details
of the annealing algorithm we used in our system can be found in the earlier
papers [5,6,7].
4.2 Protocol Representation and a Move Function
In our protocol synthesis system, a protocol is represented as a sequence of
M messages, each of which is represented by an integer sequence. N princi-
pals, indexed 0 . . . N − 1, participate in the protocol. Associated with each of
the principals are vectors of its current beliefs and formulæ. Each of the M
messages is represented by F + 3 integers, s, r, k, f1, . . . , fF . These represent
the sender, the receiver, the key that the sender used to encrypt this message,
and a series of F indices that reference formulæ currently possessed by the
sending principal. So, the sender is s mod N ; the receiver is r mod N ; the
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key is k mod NK (where NK is the number of keys possessed by the sender);
and the ﬁrst component in the message is f1 mod T etc., where the sender
possesses T formulæ, indexed 0 . . . T −1. Formula 0 is the null formula (which
allows us to model messages with fewer than F “real” formulæ). Key 0 is the
null key (message in plaintext is treated as “encrypted” by the null key). The
vectors of the receiver’s current beliefs and formulæ are updated after each
message is sent (see below). In this way, an arbitrary sequence of integers
can be interpreted as a feasible protocol (senders only ever send formulæ they
actually hold).
The above strategy allows a very simple move function for local search —
simply randomly replace some of the integers involved in some messages. 4
Although any integer sequence gives rise to a feasible protocol, the protocol
may not satisfy our required goals. The ﬁtness function below measures how
close it comes to achieving the required goals and our search seeks to ﬁnd a
protocol that satisﬁes all these goals.
4.3 Executing a Protocol
Assume that a protocol consists of M messages, each of which consists of F
formulæ, and we start from the very beginning of this protocol. Firstly, we
initialise the belief and formula state of the relevant principals involved in this
protocol. Then, for each message in this protocol, we follow the steps below.
(i) Determine the sender, receiver, and the key under which the current mes-
sage is encrypted. If this key is an appropriate one for communication
between the sender and the receiver, then proceed with the rest of the
current message, else ignore this message and proceed to the next mes-
sage. The method of decoding the sender, receiver, and key is given in
subsection 4.2.
(ii) Decode each of the F formulæ corresponding to the current message. For
instance, the ﬁrst formula in the message is f1 mod T , where the sender
currently holds T sendable formulæ.
(iii) Update the receiver’s beliefs vector by applying the SVO axioms. Here
we demonstrate what a principal A will do after it receives a message
{X,B,Na}kab from another principal B (assume both A and B initially
hold kab, and they both believe that kab is a good key for communication).
Firstly, after decryption, A recognises that this message is comprehen-
sible, thus B said X, B said B, B said Na, B has X, B has B and
4 Note: A perturbed sequence may actually give rise to the same protocol as the original
sequence. For example, if an integer denoting a sender has its value changed by a multiple
of N it will be interpreted as the same principal as before.
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B has Na are added to A’s belief vector (this represents A believes B said
X, A believes B said B, A believes B said Na, A believes B has X,
A believes B has B and A believes B has Na) whilst X, B and Na are
added to A’s formula vector. 5 After this, A examines the set of received
formulæ to see whether any of them are believed to be fresh. In this
case, A retrieves the formula Na, and as A believes the nonce Na is fresh,
then the whole message is regarded as fresh. 6 As the message is fresh,
B says X, B says B and B says Na are added to A’s belief vector.
7 Sim-
ilarly, other axioms now may be applied to deduce further beliefs until
no further beliefs can be created.
(iv) Record the number of required goals achieved after this message has been
analysed.
Once a protocol has been executed in the above way, the ﬁtness of this
protocol can be calculated as given in subsection 4.4.
4.4 The Fitness Function
The ﬁtness function is used to guide the search for a ‘good’ solution, that is,
the ﬁtness function must tell us how good a candidate solution is. We use
ﬁtness functions, f(P ), which are sums of a security ﬁtness function, s and an
eﬃciency ﬁtness function, e.
f(P ) = s(P ) + e(P )
The function s(P ) is deﬁned as follows:
s(P ) =
N∑
i=1
(σ + δ(i))×G(P, i)
Here N is the maximum number of messages we allow in any protocol; G(P, i)
is the number of new required security goals that message i of P achieves; σ is,
typically, a large constant that weights security much more heavily than eﬃ-
ciency and the δ(i) are weights among the individual messages. These weights,
δ(i), were chosen to represent one of two strategies for ﬁnding protocols, early
credit (EC) for achieving goals early in the protocol and uniform credit (UC)
which does not favour one message over another; see Table 1. Further details
of these strategies are given by Clark and Jacob [6,7].
5 By applying the SVO Receiving Axioms, Source Association Axiom and Possession Ax-
iom.
6 By applying the SVO Freshness Axiom.
7 By applying the SVO Nonce-veriﬁcation Axiom.
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Strategy Weight
δ(1) δ(2) δ(3) δ(4) δ(5) δ(6) δ(7)
EC 640 320 160 80 40 20 10
UC 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
Table 1
Weighting Strategies for N = 7
The function e(P ) is a also a sum of ﬁtness functions, one for each kind of
ﬁtness we consider.
e(P ) = m(P ) + c(P ) + r(P )
The ﬁtness function m(P ) punishes protocols with many messages.
m(P ) = µ×M(P )
where M(P ) is the highest index of a message of P that contributes new goals
and µ < 0 is the weight we give to this.
The function c(P ) punishes protocols with more encryption.
c(P ) = κ× C(P )
where C(P ) is the number of encryptions in P and κ < 0 is the weight we
give to this.
The function r(P ) punishes numbers of interactions with particular prin-
cipals.
r(P ) =
∑
a∈A(P )
ρ(a)× R(P, a)
where R(P, a) is the number of rounds involving principal a in P , A(P ) is
the set of principals in P and ρ(a) < 0 are weights which allow us to declare
that interactions with some principals (for example, the server) are worse than
others.
5 Experimental Method and Results
This section reports the results of applying the technique described above to
the derivation of three-party symmetric key distribution protocols.
5.1 Assumptions
Three parties participate in this key distribution protocol: A, B and S. Their
identiﬁers are held by each other initially.
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A holds a long term secure key kas that he believes to be secure for com-
municating with the key distribution server S. A maintains his own nonce Na
that he believes to be fresh. A is able to recognise his own identiﬁer A and
nonce Na.
Similar to principal A, principal B holds a long term secure key kbs that he
believes to be secure for communicating with S. B maintains his own nonce
Nb that he believes to be fresh. B is able to recognise his own identiﬁer B and
nonce Nb.
The server S holds kas, kbs and believes that they are secure for commu-
nicating with A and B respectively. S also holds kab and believes that it is a
good key that can be used between A and B. The assumptions are:
A has (A,B, S) A has kas A believes A
kas←→ S
A has Na A believes fresh(Na)
A believes φ(A) A believes φ(Na) A believes S controls A
kab←→ B
B has (A,B, S) B has kbs B believes B
kbs←→ S
B has Nb B believes fresh(Nb)
B believes φ(B) B believes φ(Nb) B believes S controls A
kab←→ B
S has (A,B, S)
S has kas S believes B
kas←→ S
S has kbs S believes B
kbs←→ S
S has kab S believes B
kab←→ S
5.2 Goals
The ﬁrst set of goals requires that at the end of the protocol run A and B
must each believe that it possesses a good key kab for session communication,
and that each believes the other possesses the same key.
A has kab A believes A
kab←→ B
B has kab B believes A
kab←→ B
A believes B has kab B believes A has kab
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σ 3000 Correctness is more important than eﬃciency
δ(i) EC See Table 1 for the deﬁnition
µ −200
κ −100
ρ(S) −100 S is the server
ρ(A) −50 A is a client
ρ(B) −50 B is a client
Table 2
Fitness function weightings for the ﬁrst search
1. A→S : A,B,Na
2. S→A : {Na, kab ↪→ (A
kab←→ B)}kas
3. B→S : B,A,Nb
4. S→B : {Nb, Na, kab ↪→ (A
kab←→ B)}kbs
5. B→A : {B,Nb, Na}kab
6. A→B : {Nb, A}kab
Fig. 3. A symmetric key protocol found by our tool in the ﬁrst search
5.3 Results
5.3.1 The ﬁrst search
In our ﬁrst search the annealing parameters given in subsection 4.1 were used.
We took the maximum number of messages, N = 7. The weights we used for
the ﬁtness function are given in Table 2. We used the EC strategy in order to
ﬁnd a protocol that is able to satisfy security requirements as soon as possible.
Figure 3 shows one of the symmetric key protocols generated by the pro-
gram. Only the core security relevant components of the protocol are pre-
sented. That is, we have removed components from the description that do
not contribute to the goals. In addition, redundant components (where the
same components are included twice or more in one message) have also been
removed. (Currently, redundant components are removed by hand; automat-
ing their removal is under investigation.)
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1. A→B : A,Na
2. B→S : A,Na, B,Nb
3. S→B : {Nb, kab ↪→ (A
kab←→ B)}kbs
4. S→A : {Na, Nb, kab ↪→ (A
kab←→ B)}kas
5. A→B : {A,Na, Nb}kab
6. B→A : {B,Na}kab
Fig. 4. A protocol with fewer server interactions, found by our tool when asked to try harder to
minimise server interactions
5.3.2 The second search
For our second search we asked our tool to try harder to minimise server
interactions. To do this we doubled each of ρ(S), ρ(A) and ρ(B) (that is, we
let ﬁtness function r(P ) carry more weight relative to the other properties)
and used the UC strategy for the δ(i) (see Table 1). All other parameters are
as in Table 2.
A new protocol (see Figure 4) with fewer server interactions than any pro-
tocol generated in the ﬁrst search was found by our tool.
The ﬁrst search might have produced the protocol in Figure 4, but without
the demands given in the second search, it did not.
5.4 Comments
It is possible to ask our tool to ﬁnd a protocol for an assumptions/goals
pair that cannot be met, or is diﬃcult to meet. In such cases, the search
will terminate without producing a protocol or produce a protocol that only
satisﬁes some of the goals.
One pleasing feature of the work is the speed at which protocols are gen-
erated. A typical run takes two minutes or less (on a Pentium Mobile 1.5G
processor with 512MB memory, JavaTM 2 SDK 1.4.2 and Borland JBuilder 9).
This compares very favourably with other design synthesis approaches, for ex-
ample model checking [11].
6 Conclusions and Further Work
The above work shows that meta-heuristic search approaches to secure pro-
tocol synthesis are potentially powerful and have the beneﬁt of being rapid.
Our tools generate candidate protocols rapidly and concrete reﬁnements of
them could be subjected to more detailed and sophisticated analysis (such as
C. Hao et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 125 (2005) 25–41 39
that provided by current model checking approaches). This would provide an
interesting synthesis of current techniques. The protocols generated, although
simple, are typical abstractions of protocols in the literature.
There is very little published work in the ﬁeld of protocol eﬃciency. With
our protocol synthesis approach, we have provided a framework for incorpo-
rating eﬃciency concerns into the synthesis approach (in terms of the number
of messages, server interactions etc.).
However, we note that the eﬃciency of a protocol cannot be fully charac-
terised independently of its implementation details. Thus, one topic of further
work is to investigate more eﬃciency issues of security protocols and how to
make tradeoﬀs among these concerns.
In this paper, we demonstrate that our system has the ability to synthesise
three-party authentication and key transport protocols using symmetric key
cryptography. Key agreement protocols have become much more popular than
key transport protocols in recent years. SVO logic has the ability to analysis
key agreement protocols. We believe that our synthesis system can easily
be extended to encompass public key scheme and synthesise key agreement
protocols.
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